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When Is a Mutual Fund Director Independent?
The Unexplored Role of Professional Relationships Under
Section 2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act
Larry D. Barnett*
ABSTRACT:
[An investment company that must register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("the Commission") is required by the Invest-
ment Company Act ("the Act") to have a specified percentage or
number of directors who are not "interested" in the company. To be
not interested (i.e., to be independent), a director of an investment
company is barred by § 2(a)(19) of the Act from inter alia having
had, during the last two completed fiscal years of the company, a
material business relationship or a material professional relationship
with specified parties. The Commission, in interpreting § 2(a)(19),
has not clearly distinguished the two types of relationships and has
not focused on professional relationships apart from business rela-
tionships. The present article contends that this is contrary to the in-
tent of Congress. Accordingly, the article first identifies both the
elements of a business relationship and the elements of a professional
relationship. Second, three no-action letters are reviewed, in each of
which the Commission staff could have found that a proposed ar-
rangement would have created a professional relationship for an in-
vestment company director.]
"Congress entrusted to the independent directors of investment com-
panies... the primary responsibility for looking after the interests of
the funds' shareholders. "1
I. INTRODUCTION
A scandal in the public sector is not only grist for the mass media; it
is also an opportunity to learn about the nature of society. A scandal
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1. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 485 (1979).
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affects societal conditions and probably results from them as well, 2
and is therefore a subject that should be viewed sociologically. 3 In-
deed, the word "scandal" refers inter alia to events that erode confi-
dence in institutions,4 making scandals an inherently sociological
topic. The misdeeds of corporations such as Enron and WorldCoin
that became widely recognized during the first half of 20025 have ap-
propriately been labeled a scandal,6 as they caused many Americans
to doubt the integrity of their financial organizations: the proportion
of adults in the United States who expressed "very little confidence"
or "no confidence at all" in the "financial industry" almost doubled
from 19% in January 2002 to 35% in July 2002. During the same pe-
riod, the proportion having "a great deal of confidence" in the finan-
cial industry declined from 10% to 5%. 7
Even though scandalous activities undermine the social order, the
corporations whose misconduct came to light in 2002 must be viewed
against the background of the total number of entities forming the
2. Ari Adut, A Theory of Scandal: Victorians, Homosexuality, and the Fall of Oscar Wilde, 111
AM. J. Soc. 213, 213 (2005).
3. In this regard, it is notable that dictionary definitions of scandal include "[a] publicized
incident that ... offends the moral sensibilities of society." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
1554 (4th ed. 2000) (emphasis added).
4. E.g., J. Curtis Greene, Note, New Regulations for Lawyers: The SEC'S Final Rule For
Professional Conduct in the Wake of Sarbanes-Oxley: Challenges for Foreign Attorneys, 14 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 807, 810-815 (2004).
5. John A. Weinberg, Accounting for Corporate Behavior, EcoN. Q., Summer 2003, at 1.
While the 1980s and 1990s witnessed an increase in identifiable instances of misstatements by
companies of their financial results, "the events of 2002 represented unprecedented levels of
both the number and the size of companies involved." Id. at 18.
6. The application of the concept of scandal to the misconduct of corporations at this time is
illustrated by a reviewer of a book that was published in 2005 on "the Enron scandal" who finds
in the book "fresh reasons for outrage." Wendy Zellner, Inside Enron's House of Cards, Bus.
WK., March 21, 2005, at 20 (reviewing KURT EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF FOOLS: A TRUE
STORY ( Broadway 2005)). The outrage generated by a scandal is, of course, inconsistent with
social stability.
7. See Hart and Teeter Research Companies, Roper Center Public Opinion Online, Dec. 7-10,
2000, available at LEXIS accession no. 0376547 (Public Opinion Location Library or Public
Opinion Online database); Hart and Teeter Research Companies, Roper Center Public Opinion
Online, Jan.18-21, 2002, available at LEXIS accession no. 0397267 (Public Opinion Location
Library or Public Opinion Online database); Hart and Teeter Research Companies, Roper
Center Public Opinion Online, July 19-21, 2002, available at LEXIS accession no. 0411854 (Pub-
lic Opinion Location Library or Public Opinion Online database). The changes in confidence
from January 2002 to July 2002 are especially notable because confidence levels were stable
between December 2000 and January 2002.
See also 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 705 (2d ed. 1989). In the context of the question
used in the cited surveys, the word "confidence" is "the mental attitude of trusting in or relying
on a person or thing; firm trust, reliance, faith" and is thus synonymous with trust.
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economy of the United States. Business entities are numerous,8 and
only a minuscule percentage of them seem to have engaged in activi-
ties harmful to society. However, while just a small fraction of entities
in the economic sector produce scandals and damage the confidence
of present and potential investors in securities markets, the entities
that do so attract considerable attention from both the news media
and the institution of law. The public focus on offending entities is
instructive. Given the relatively limited number of entities that imperil
confidence in the economic sector of society, the focus underscores an
important sociological principle: that confidence in others is a critical
constituent of the social fabric and normally goes unnoticed.9
When scandals are absent, why does the public exhibit little or no
interest in the subject of confidence in the institutions of society?1 0
Fickleness is unlikely to explain the ephemeral nature of a general,
conscious focus on such confidence. Instead, the rarity of public con-
cern with confidence in institutions can be explained by the conditions
necessary for the existence of sustained social interaction and groups:
confidence (i.e., trust) in others is, and must be, generally presumed
by the participants in social relationships, and this expectation must
generally be fulfilled, because such confidence is a prerequisite to
group life and to the economic prosperity that group life makes
possible.11
A social system, in short, cannot operate effectively if the trust of its
participants in one or more of the institutions of the system is below
some minimum level for a protracted period, 12 and for this reason, a
social system cannot tolerate a lengthy, substantial decline in trust.
8. An indicator of the number of businesses that exist in the United States in a particular year
is the number of federal income tax returns that businesses file with the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice. In 2001, corporations and partnerships together filed more than seven million returns.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-2005 483 tbl. 716
(124th ed. 2004).
9. See J. David Lewis & Andrew Weigert, Trust as a Social Reality, 63 Soc. FORCES 967 (1985)
(discussing trust as an aspect of social relationships).
10. As used in this article, the word "institution" refers to a general pattern of interpersonal
behavior that is found in a society and that is fundamental to the operation of the society. An
institution is thus "an established.., custom, usage, practice ... or other element in the political
or social life of a people; a regulative principle or convention subservient to the needs of an
organized community or the general ends of civilization." 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
1047 (2nd ed. 1989). Collectively, institutions are the building blocks of a society and form its
structure.
11. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY
9, 47 (The Free Press 1995).
12. See Clancy v. Superior Court, 705 P.2d 347, 351 (Cal. 1985) (explaining that the institution
of law cannot contribute to the functioning of society when public confidence in the institution is
lacking).
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Indeed, research in sociology suggests that scandals have just a short-
term impact on trust in institutions.' 3 The impact on trust is brief be-
cause if informal mechanisms fail to restore the trust that has been
eroded by scandals, the subsystem of society that produces and en-
forces law will do so. The core purpose of law is to deal with the types
of problems in interpersonal relationships that significantly affect the
operation of the social order. 14
Unfortunately, the threshold of trust in institutions required for a
society to function in a given manner and with a given degree of effec-
tiveness is unknown, and the exact paths by which this trust influences
a social system are as yet undetermined, because rigorous social sci-
ence research on trust is scarce. The dearth of well-designed studies of
trust is a result of the general neglect of the subject by sociologists
until the 1990s. This neglect, in turn, explains at least partially the ab-
sence of sophisticated studies of the role of trust in securities markets.
Nonetheless, available research indicates that, in a society, the level of
trust is positively correlated with the size and robustness of the finan-
cial sector: an increase in trust benefits the financial sector, and a de-
crease in trust harms it.15 Because the financial sector in the United
States includes inter alia securities markets, the variable of trust pre-
sumably has a major bearing on the effectiveness of these markets
and, hence, on the well-being of the economy. This proposition is ex-
plicitly accepted by Congress. 16
Law in general serves the social system in which it exists: law is
formulated to meet the needs and endorse the values of society.17 The
13. See Pamela Paxton, Is Social Capital Declining in the United States? A Multiple Indicator
Assessment, 105 AM. J. Soc. 88, 117-119 (1999).
14. See Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 164 (Cal. 1969). "Indeed, the early common law posited
'rights and duties upon the relationship of parties within the socio-economic system rather than
upon factors, such as consensual agreement, dependent on the will of individual litigants' and
such relationship concepts served as the major framework of the legal structure." Id.
15. Cesdr Calder6n et a., Development and Efficiency of the Financial Sector and Links with
Trust: Cross-Country Evidence, 51 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 189 (2002); Paul J. Zak
& Stephen Knack, Trust and Growth, 111 ECON. J. 295, 307-311 (2001). See Diana C, Mutz,
Social Trust and E-Commerce: Experimental Evidence for the Effects of Social Trust on Individu-
als' Economic Behavior, 69 PuB. OPINION Q. 393 (2005) (suggesting that there is a causal role for
social trust influencing commerce).
16. "The Nation's capital markets play a critical role in our domestic economy by creating jobs
and expanding businesses. ... The success of the U.S. securities markets is largely the result of a
high level of investor confidence in the integrity and efficiency of our markets." SENATE COMM.
ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT
OF 1995, S. REP. No. 104-98, at 8 (1st Sess. 1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687 [here-
inafter S. REP. No. 104-98].
17. LARRY D. BARNETI, LEGAL CONSTRUCT, SOCIAL CONCEPT (Aldine De Gruyter 1993).
See United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795, 820 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (not-
ing that "society, economic pressures, [and] philosophic notions," have influenced the law).
[Vol. 4:155
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Investment Company Act ("Act"),' 8 which was adopted in 1940 9 and
is the focus of the present article, is illustrative. Congress, recognizing
the potential of investment companies to contribute to economic
growth in the United States,2 0 sought explicitly through the Act to
raise the level of confidence that could be placed in investment com-
panies by investors, especially those having relatively small amounts
of money to buy securities. 21 The legislation, in moving to restore and
maintain the trust of Americans generally in the financial institution
of their society,2 2 would have concomitantly served to improve the
reputation of that institution. It did so in part by creating a set of rules
for the behavior of investment companies, including rules for these
companies to follow in structuring themselves internally and in part by
symbolizing important social values, especially fairness. 23 Thus, just as
anti-virus and firewall software works with only occasional notice to
protect the integrity of a computer, the Act similarly operates to pro-
mote the integrity of the social system. Specifically, the Act eliminates
a basis for persistent public doubts regarding whether investment
companies in the United States treat their investors fairly.24
The societal function of the Act was illustrated by the scandal that
emerged in the latter part of 2003 involving a number of investment
companies. 25 The negative impact of the scandal on the public image
of the mutual fund industry was apparently offset to a large degree by
other factors, 26 and while these factors cannot be identified with cer-
18. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to -65 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
19. H.R. 10066, 76th Cong. (3d Sess. 1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -65
(2000 & Supp. II 2002).
20. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 AND
INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, S. REP. No. 76-1775, at 5 (3d Sess. 1940) [hereinafter
SENATE REPORT No. 76-1775].
21. Id. at 6, 12. See also Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Alfred Investment Trust, 58 F. Supp. 724,
732 (D. Mass. 1945), affd, 151 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1945).
22. The Securities Act and Securities Exchange Act had the same underlying purpose as the
Investment Company Act. "Congress enacted the 1933 and 1934 Acts to promote investor confi-
dence in the United States securities markets and thereby to encourage the investment necessary
for capital formation, economic growth, and job creation." SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, Hous-
ING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995, S. REP. No.
104-98, at 4 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
23. LARRY D. BARNETT, Social Productivity, Law, and the Regulation of Conflicts of Interests
in the Investment Industry, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL'Y & ETHICS J. 701 (2006).
24. See THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 34-35 (Yale Univ. Press
1935) (discussing that the law serves to comfort society).
25. The activities of the investment companies were first publicized in September 2003. Stan
Luxenberg, Gray Matter, REGISTERED REP., Sept. 1, 2005, at 27.
26. See Investment Company Institute, Shareholder Sentiment of the Mutual Fund Industry,
FUNDAMENTALS, Oct. 2004, at 1, 3-4, available at http://www.ici.org/stats/res/fm-v14n7.pdf (last
visited Feb. 6, 2006).
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tainty, the failure of the scandal to have a substantial effect on inves-
tors27 is probably attributable in part to a widespread belief in the
adequacy of existing legislation applicable to investment companies.
An indicator of such a belief is that the Act was not changed legisla-
tively in response to the scandal. The belief is likely to have been sup-
ported by a realization that relatively few fund families were
implicated in the scandal2 8 and to have been reinforced by actions
taken by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Commission,
as the administrative agency authorized by the Act to regulate invest-
ment companies, 29 imposed civil sanctions on parties responsible for
violations of the Act 30 and adopted new rules under the Act. 31 The
sociological function of law need not involve change in statutory pro-
visions but may be manifested in other ways, and in this instance
was.
3 2
By way of summary, in the absence of the Investment Company
Act, prolonged and widespread doubts about investment companies
would be likely, and these doubts would appreciably reduce the num-
27. Technometrica Institute of Policy & Polling, Roper Center Public Opinion Online, Dec. 1-
7. 2003, available at LEXIS accession no. 044175 (Public Opinion Location Library or Public
Opinion Online database). In a telephone survey conducted in December 2003 of a sample of
adults in the United States, three out of four respondents stated that they had not altered their
"mutual fund investment plans" because of "the recent mutual fund scandals"; just one out of
eight respondents had shifted into "other types of investments." Id.
28. The fund families targeted by the Securities and Exchange Commission are listed in Fund
Families Under Investigation, MORNINGSTAR FUNDINVESTOR, April 2005, at 17.
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-37, 80a-41 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
30. E.g., In re Janus Capital Mgmt, LLC, Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No.
26532, available at 2004 SEC LEXIS 1797, at *28 (Aug. 18, 2004); In re Banc of Am. Capital
Mgmt., LLC, Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 26756, available at 2005 SEC
LEXIS 291, at *89 (Feb. 9, 2005); In re Southwest Sec., Inc., Investment Company Act of 1940
Release No. 2341, available at 2005 SEC LEXIS 41, at *30-32 (Jan.10, 2005). Sanctions were
also imposed on investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act. See In re Janus Capital
Mgmt., LLC, Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 26532, available at 2004 SEC
LEXIS 1797, at *28 (Aug. 18, 2004) (requiring investment company to cease and desist from
committing violations of the Advisers Act and Investment Company Act); In re Banc of Am.
Capital Mgmt., LLC, Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 26756, available at 2005
SEC LEXIS 291, at *89 (Feb. 9, 2005) (Commission censured Bank of America under the Advis-
ers Act and required that they cease and desist from violating various securities laws).
31. See Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. 46378 (Aug. 2, 2004) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 270) and Prohibition on the Use of Brokerage Commissions to Finance Distribution,
69 Fed. Reg. 54728 (Sept. 9, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270) (adopting amendments under
the Investment Company Act of 1940).
32. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Exemptive Rule Amendments of 2004: The Independent
Chair Condition, A Report in Accordance with the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, at
2005 SEC LEXIS 1031, at *3 (April 2005) (noting that the Commission responded to the scan-
dal, which had involved "a significant betrayal of mutual fund investors' trust" and had "under-
mined investor confidence in the mutual fund industry," with enforcement actions and rule
making).
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ber of investors in investment companies. The Act, and the authority
of the Securities and Exchange Commission to enforce the Act, fur-
nishes investors with a basis for assuming that investment companies
operate in an evenhanded manner. 33 This assumption is a necessary
condition for investment companies to be trusted by the public, and it
thereby helps to supply the societal foundation that the companies
require to be an important vehicle for finance. 34
II. THE INVESTMENT COMPANY Acr AND ITS REQUIREMENTS FOR
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
The Investment Company Act contains numerous provisions, but a
central aspect of the Act is its focus on boards of directors. While one
form of investment company recognized by the Act (the unit invest-
ment trust),35 operates without a board, all open-end management in-
vestment companies, 36 commonly called mutual funds, are governed
by boards.37 Open-end funds, in terms of the assets they manage, are
indisputably the dominant form of investment company in the United
States. 38 As explained more fully below, the board of a mutual fund
must have the minimum percentage of independent directors set by
the Act, and for mutual funds in certain categories the Commission,
through rules, has mandated a minimum percentage of independent
directors that is appreciably higher than the percentage fixed by the
33. Congress explicitly recognized in the Investment Company Act that "the national public
interest" is harmed when investment companies favor certain of their participants over others
and stated that a goal of the Act was to end, or at least minimize, such favoritism. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-l(b)(2)- (3) (2000). The Investment Company Act is supplemented by the Investment
Advisers Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2000 & Supp. II 2002). The latter Act applies to
inter alia an investment adviser responsible for the securities portfolio of an investment com-
pany. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). Section 206 of the Investment Advisers
Act requires an investment adviser to inform its clients, including clients that are investment
companies, about any practice or undertaking by the adviser that discriminates unfairly between
the clients or that has the potential to do so. E.g., Monetta Fin. Serv. .Inc. v. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, 390 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that § 206 of the Advisers Act required investment
advisor to disclose IPO allocations to director-clients). Section 206 is codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-6 (2000).
34. The Investment Company Act, as a mechanism to reduce the risk to the public posed by
investment companies, illustrates a defining feature of the current epoch in history. See PETER
L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS 1 ((John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1998). The Act thus embodies
an important cultural value.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4(2) (2000).
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-4(3), 80a-5 (2000).
37. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2005 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 116, 117
(45th ed. 2005), at http://www.ici.org/stats/res/2005_factbook.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
38. At the end of 2004, for example, the net assets of open-end funds that were not money
market funds exceeded the combined assets of closed-end funds and unit investment trusts by a
ratio of more than 21 to 1. Id. at 61, 69, 71.
162 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
Act. Furthermore, whether a director is independent is determined by
detailed criteria explicitly established in the Act. It is notable that the
focus of the Act on directors is unique in federal securities legislation:
no other federal securities statute extensively regulates the composi-
tion of boards of directors. From an international perspective, moreo-
ver, an emphasis on investment company directors is not universal in
law; other countries do not uniformly require, or even permit, boards
of directors for their mutual funds.39
In the United States, independent directors have been required by
statute for mutual fund boards in order to protect the investors in the
funds.40 But what in the nature of mutual funds poses a risk to inves-
tors that independent directors can counter? The answer lies in the
conflicts of interests that characterize the funds.
... Unlike a typical corporation, a fund generally has no employ-
ees of its own. Its officers are usually employed and compensated by
the fund's investment adviser, which is a separately owned and op-
erated entity. The fund relies on its investment adviser and other
affiliates - who are usually the very companies that sponsored the
fund's organization - for basic services, including investment ad-
vice, administration, and distribution.
Due to this unique structure, conflicts of interest can arise be-
tween a fund and the fund's investment adviser because the inter-
ests of the fund do not always parallel the interests of the adviser.
An investment adviser's interest in maximizing its own profits for
the benefit of its owners may conflict with its paramount duty to act
solely in the best interests of the fund and its shareholders. 41
The requirements imposed on directors by the Act are designed to
secure directors for a fund who have no significant conflicts of inter-
ests and who can therefore fulfill their duty of loyalty to the investors
in the fund. However, the requirements have been changed by Con-
gress since the Act was adopted in 1940. Originally, the Act mandated
that, with certain exceptions, at least 40% of the directors of a regis-
tered investment company 42 must be persons who were not (i) invest-
39. Wallace Wen Yeu Wang, Corporate versus Contractual Mutual Funds: An Evaluation of
Structure and Governance, 69 WASH. L. REV. 927 (1994).
40. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484-485 (1979).
41. Interpretive Matters Concerning Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Re-
lease No. IC-24083, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,877, 59,877 (Nov. 3, 1999) [hereinafter Release No. IC-
240831.
42. An investment vehicle that qualifies as an investment company under § 3 of the Act is
barred by § 7 of the Act from engaging in the activities specified by § 7 until it has registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to § 8 of the Act. For example, until it
has registered with the Commission, the investment company cannot employ an instrumentality
of interstate commerce to offer for sale or sell any securities it has issued. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3,
80a-7, 80a-8 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
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ment advisers, or persons affiliated with an investment adviser, to the
investment company, or (ii) officers or employees of the investment
company. 43 A director was "affiliated" with the investment adviser to
the investment company if inter alia the director (i) directly or indi-
rectly owned, controlled, or could vote at least 5% of the outstanding
voting securities issued by the adviser; (ii) directly or indirectly con-
trolled the adviser, was controlled by the adviser, or was controlled by
a third person who controlled both the director and the adviser; or
(iii) was an officer, director, partner, copartner, employee, or member
of an advisory board of the adviser.44
In December 1970, Congress extensively amended the Investment
Company Act to broaden the criteria that directors must satisfy in
order to be deemed independent. 45 Specifically, the revision of the
Act defined an independent director as one who is not "interested" in
the investment company, and thus the Act now directs that generally a
minimum of 40% of the directors of a registered investment company
must be not "interested" in the company.46 The Commission, how-
43. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 10(a), 54 Stat. 789, 806 (1940). Directors
satisfying these requirements were deemed "independent." SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, S.
REP. No. 76-1775, at 14 (3d Sess. 1940). While the Act has been amended to change substan-
tially the requirements for qualifying as an independent director, as will be discussed in the text
infra, notes 45-50 and accompanying text, two requirements for boards have remained essen-
tially the same. Ch. 686, §§ 10(b)(1), 10(b)(3), 54 Stat. at 806 (1940); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10(b)(1),
80a-10(b)(3) (2000). First, the Act requires a majority of the directors of a registered investment
company not to be a regular broker (or affiliated with a regular broker) for the investment
company when a director, officer or employee of the investment company (or a person with
which a director, officer or employee is affiliated) is a regular broker for the company. Id. at
§ 80a-10(b)(1). Second, a majority of the directors of a registered investment company must be
persons who are not an investment banker (or affiliated with an investment banker) if a director,
officer or employee of the investment company is an investment banker or is affiliated with an
investment banker. Id. at § 80(a)-10(b)(3).
44. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(3) (2005). "Control" is defined in 15
U.S.C. § 80a(9). Id. The criteria for affiliation and the definition of control have not changed
since the Act was adopted in 1940. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(3), 80a-2(a)(9) (2000).
45. Investment Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, §§ 2, 5, 84 Stat. 1413,
1414, 1416 (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)). The prerequisites for serving as an inde-
pendent director were further modified in 1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Moderni-
zation Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 213, 113 Stat. 1338, 1397, 1398 (codified as amended
15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-2(a)(19)(A)).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2000). See supra note 43 and accompanying text (identifying statu-
tory exceptions to the 40% minimum). Additional exceptions include the following:
First, under specified conditions, the board of a registered open-end investment company can
be comprised of directors all but one of whom are interested in the investment adviser to the
company or are officers or employees of the company. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(d) (2000). This provi-
sion was designed for an investment company that was created by an investment adviser specifi-
cally to serve investors who have relatively small sums of money for securities investments and
would therefore have been unable to procure individually the services of the adviser. Charter
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ever, has utilized its rulemaking authority47 to require even higher
percentages of non-interested (i.e., independent) directors. Since July
2002, if the investment company is exempted from a provision of the
Act by any one of ten Commission rules, a majority of directors must
be not interested. 48 As of January 2006, a minimum of three out of
four directors of such an investment company must be not interested 49
unless the requirement is judicially nullified.5 0
Under what conditions is a person not interested in an investment
company of which the person is a director? Section 2(a)(19) of the
Investment Company Act imposes a variety of requirements to be not
interested (i.e., to be independent). Thus, an independent director of
an investment company cannot inter alia be affiliated with the com-
pany, its investment adviser or its principal underwriter, or be within
the "immediate family" of a person who is affiliated.5 1 Affiliation, a
Funds, SEC No-Action Letter (July 6, 1993), 1993 SEC No-Act LEXIS 977, at *2; SENATE
COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 AND INVESTMENT
ADVISERS Acr OF 1940, S. REP. No. 76-1775, at 14 (3d Sess. 1940). Second, the Act requires a
majority of the directors of a registered investment company to be persons who are neither a
principal underwriter for, nor interested in a principal underwriter for, the investment company
when a director, officer or employee of the investment company (or a person in which a director,
officer or employee is interested) is a principal underwriter for the company. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
10(b)(2) (2000).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37 (2000).
48. Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Re-
lease No. IC-24816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 16, 2001) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 240, 270,
274).
49. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-26520, 69
Fed. Reg. 46,378 (Aug. 2, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270). On a board with three directors,
at least two will need to be not interested. Id.
50. Chamber of Commerce of United States v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 412 F.3d 133, rehearing
denied, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19602 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Investment Company Governance, In-
vestment Company Act Release No. IC-26985, 70 Fed. Reg. 39,390 (July 7, 2005) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 270). The Chamber of Commerce has filed a petition with the Court of Appeals seek-
ing a review of the Commission action that resulted in Release No. IC-26985. Opening Brief of
Petitioner for Review of Final Rule of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
(No. 05-1240), 2005 WL 2543995.
51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(i)-(A)(iii), 80a-(2)(a)(19)(B)(i)-(B)(ii) (2000). Under the
Act, "'[aiffiliated person' of another person means (A) any person directly or indirectly owning,
controlling, or holding with power to vote, 5 per centum or more of the outstanding voting
securities of such other person; (B) any person 5 per centum or more of whose outstanding
voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by such
other person; (C) any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common
control with, such other person; (D) any officer, director, partner, copartner, or employee of
such other person; (E) if such other person is an investment company, any investment adviser
thereof or any member of an advisory board thereof; and (F) if such other person is an unincor-
porated investment company not having a board of directors, the depositor thereof." 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-2(a)(3) (2000). However, a director of an investment company is not interested in the
company simply by being a director of the company or an owner of securities it has issued. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). The "immediate family" encompasses a
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concept that was in the Act in 1940, is thus now merely one of the
criteria for whether a director is independent. 52 In addition, an inde-
pendent director of an investment company, within the past two com-
pleted fiscal years of the company, cannot have personally furnished
legal counsel to the company, its investment adviser or its principal
underwriter, or have been a partner or employee of a person who has
done so.53
A further requirement for independence is concerned with the
types of relationships in which a director who is a "natural person"
(i.e., a human being) is involved. 54 This requirement appears in
paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii) of § 2(a)(19).55 Of the various re-
quirements in the section, paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii) have the
spouse, a parent, a spouse of a parent, a child, a spouse of a child, and a sibling. Step and
adoptive relationships can place an individual within the immediate family. Id. at. § 80a-2(a)(19).
52. The importance of distinguishing affiliation from interest is underscored by Twentieth
Century Investors, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 78,628, at 81,334 (Feb. 19, 1972), available at 1972 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 805.
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iv), 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(iv) (2000).These statutory provisions
are considered and explained in G.T. Global Growth Series, SEC No-Action Letter, [1996-1997
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,215, at 77,084 (Feb. 2, 1996), available at 1996
SEC No-Act LEXIS 323. As defined in the Act, a "person" can be either an entity or a human
being. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(28) (2000).
54. Congress, in drafting the Investment Company Act, evidently intended to allow an artifi-
cial person (i.e., an entity), as well as a natural person, to be an investment company director.
The Act defines a director as "any director of a corporation or any person performing similar
functions with respect to any organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated, including
any natural person who is a member of a board of trustees of a management company created as
a common-law trust." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(12) (2000) (emphasis added). In its definition, there-
fore, Congress recognized that a director could be either a "person" or a "natural person." Id.
Notably, Congress defined the word "person" to be "a natural person or a company" and in-
cluded corporations and partnerships - i.e., entities - among the referents of the word "com-
pany." 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(8), 80a-2(a)(28) (2000) (emphasis added). Since a director can be
a "person" and a person can be an entity, Congress seems to have accepted entities as directors
of investment companies. Id. However, an entity that is a director of an investment company
will be represented by a natural person. Id. If the representative is interested in the investment
company, the Commission could impute that interest to the entity. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-47(a)
(2000).
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(vii), 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(vii) (Supp. II 2002). As originally en-
acted in 1970, the paragraphs were numbered (A)(vi) and (B)(vi), respectively. Investment
Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 2(a), 84 Stat. 1413, 1414 (1970) (codi-
fied as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 80). In legislation adopted in 1999, the paragraphs were
redesignated (A)(vii) and (B)(vii), with no alteration in the wording of the paragraphs. Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 213, 113 Stat. 1338, 1397-1398
(1999) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)). The redesignation became effective in 2001.
See id. at § 225, 113 Stat. at 1402.
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most uncertain scope. This scope is the focus of the remainder of the
present article.56
III. PARAGRAPHS (A)(vII) AND (B)(vii) OF § 2(A)(19)
Under paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii) of § 2(a)(19), a director of
an investment company will be interested in the company, and hence
cannot be deemed independent, if the Commission concludes that the
director had, during the last two completed fiscal years of the invest-
ment company, a material business or professional relationship with
any of the following parties: (i) the investment company or the princi-
pal executive officer of the investment company on whose board the
director serves; (ii) an investment adviser to, or a principal under-
writer for, the investment company on whose board the director
serves; (iii) another investment company, or the principal executive
officer of another investment company, that has the same investment
adviser or principal underwriter as the company on whose board the
director serves; or (iv) the principal executive officer of, or a person in
control of, an investment adviser to or a principal underwriter for the
investment company on whose board the director serves. 57
It should be noted that a director will be deemed interested under
paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii) only if the Commission issues an or-
der finding that, during the two-year period designated by the statute,
a material business or professional relationship existed between the
56. Other requirements to be an independent director, which are not identified in the text, are
in paragraphs (A)(v), (A)(vi), (B)(v), and (B)(vi) of § 80a-2(a)(19). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)
(Supp. II 2002).
57. Under paragraph § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(vii), interest in an investment company exists on the
part of :
any natural person whom the Commission by order shall have determined to be an
interested person by reason of having had, at any time since the beginning of the last
two completed fiscal years of such company, a material business or professional rela-
tionship with such company or with the principal executive officer of such company or
with any other investment company having the same investment adviser or principal
underwriter or with the principal executive officer of such other investment company.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(vii) (Supp. II 2002).
Section 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iii) provides that a person interested in an investment adviser to or a
principal underwriter for an investment company is interested in the investment company. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iii) (2000). Under paragraph (B)(vii), interest in an investment adviser
to an investment company, or a principal underwriter for an investment company, exists on the
part of:
any natural person whom the Commission by order shall have determined to be an
interested person by reason of having had at any time since the beginning of the last
two completed fiscal years of such investment company a material business or profes-
sional relationship with such investment adviser or principal underwriter or with the
principal executive officer or any controlling person of such investment adviser or prin-
cipal underwriter. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(vii) (Supp. II 2002).
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director and any one of the specified parties. The order must be pre-
ceded by notice to the parties and an opportunity for a hearing.58
Moreover, the order alters the status of the director only after, and
not before, the order is issued; the director will not be considered in-
terested prior to an order that concludes there was a material business
or professional relationship between the director and a specified
party. Significantly, paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii) do not permit the
Commission to promulgate a rule dealing with such relationships in
general but, instead, require the Commission to review each case indi-
vidually. This approach was chosen by Congress in order to minimize
the consequences to an investment company from an accidental
breach of the mandates of the Act regarding directors.59 The Act
both prescribes the minimum number of independent directors for an
investment company that has a board and charges independent direc-
tors with performing certain important tasks. For example, the Act
provides that the independent directors must scrutinize every pro-
posed contract of the company with an investment adviser and princi-
pal underwriter, and must find, by majority vote, that the terms of the
contract benefit the shareholders of the company.60 In addition, rules
promulgated by the Commission to implement the Act impose tasks
on just the independent directors (e.g. the independent directors of a
registered open-end investment company must approve the use of the
assets of the company to compensate distributors of securities issued
by the company). 61 Actions taken by a board having an insufficient
number of independent directors, or by directors who are required to
be but who are not independent, may be voided.62 The status of a
director as independent or interested is therefore critical. However,
given the inescapable uncertainty that exists as to when a director is
involved in a material business or professional relationship, the Com-
mission is obligated to initiate an inquiry into whether a relationship is
business or professional in character and whether such a relationship
is material. If the Commission establishes that such a relationship ex-
58. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-39 (2000).
59. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS
ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 91-184, at 33, 34 (1st Sess. 1969) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT No. 91-
184]; HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, INVESTMENT COMPANY
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1970, H. REP. No. 91-1382, at 14, 15 (2d Sess. 1970) [hereinafter HOUSE
REPORT No. 91-1382].
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-15(a), 80a-15(c) (2000); Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 421 (2d Cir.
1961).
61. 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1 (2004).
62. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Exponential Tech., Inc., No. 16,315 (Del. Ch. Jan. 21, 1999), 24
DEL. J. CORP. L. 949, 962 (1999) (unreported case).
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isted during the statutory period, the director cannot retroactively be
treated as having been interested.
Paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii), when decomposed, present three
separate questions. The first question is whether a relationship be-
tween a director and a specified party is material. However, this ques-
tion is not of concern in the present article and will be discussed only
briefly. The answer to the question, which presupposes the existence
of a business or professional relationship, depends on the threshold at
which a relationship becomes material. According to committee re-
ports of both the Senate and the House, a relationship is to be deemed
material whenever the relationship "might tend to impair the indepen-
dence of" the director. 63 The choice of the words "might" and "tend"
in defining materiality suggests that Congress wanted just a minimal
catalyst to create a material relationship: a relationship is material
when it may entice a director qua director to act in a manner that
benefits persons other than the shareholders of the investment
company.
While the question of materiality is not a concern of the present
article, the two other questions raised by paragraphs (A)(vii) and
(B)(vii) are directly pertinent and, indeed, must be answered before
materiality is considered. Stated succinctly, the second and third ques-
tions raised by paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii) are: What is a busi-
ness relationship, and what is a professional relationship? Curiously,
the questions have not, to date, been clearly distinguished by the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission. For example, the sole release of
the Commission on the types of business or professional relationships
that might be deemed material under paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii)
does not explicitly differentiate a "business" relationship from a "pro-
fessional" relationship, let alone supply a definition of each. 64 As a
matter of statutory construction, however, whether the character of a
relationship is business or professional should precede the question of
whether a relationship is material, because the elements of materiality
are likely to differ between a professional relationship and a business
relationship (i.e., the factors determining whether a business relation-
ship is material are probably not the factors determining whether a
professional relationship is material. Thus, the type of a relationship
(business or professional) is logically prior to, and must be ascertained
before, the materiality of a relationship.
63. S. REP. No. 91-184, at 33; H.R. REP. No. 91-1382, at 14.
64. Interpretive Matters Concerning Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Re-
lease No. IC 24083, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,877 (Nov.3, 1999). The release presented the views of the
staff, not of the commissioners. Id. at 59879.
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Paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii), consequently, require an analysis
that is more detailed than has been undertaken to date by the Com-
mission. Paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii) name both business relation-
ships and professional relationships, and Congress must be presumed
to have wanted the paragraphs to cover different types of relation-
ships. Each paragraph identifies not only relationships of a business
nature but also relationships of a professional nature, and each para-
graph inserts the word "or" between the word "business" and the
word "professional." That Congress used the disjunctive when listing
the relationships to be encompassed by the paragraphs suggests a leg-
islative intent to reach two distinct classes of activities.
To decide whether one type of activity or two are encompassed by
paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii), we turn to judicially recognized rules
of statutory interpretation. 65 Although not determinative, rules of
statutory interpretation are helpful in ascertaining the referents of a
statute. 66 Thus, rules that are pertinent to the problem at hand will
now be considered.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, "statutes must be inter-
preted, if possible, to give each word some operative effect," 67 and a
word can be ignored only if it appears in a statutory provision whose
legislative purpose requires that the word be disregarded.68 From
committee reports on the legislation that placed the concept of inter-
ested person in the Investment Company Act 69 it is clear that Con-
gress developed the concept, and limited the proportion of board
positions that can be filled by interested directors,70 in order to pro-
tect investors. Directors who are not interested in their investment
company, being less likely to suffer from conflicts of interests, are ex-
65. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRucrION §§ 45:01 to 48: 19
(6th ed. 2000).
66. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001).
67. Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 209 (1997); Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 577, 579 (2004). See SINGER, supra note 65, at
§ 46.06 for a general discussion of this rule of statutory interpretation.
68. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1978) (words in a federal
statute are to be construed "in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve"); United Steel-
workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) ("[i]t is a 'familiar rule, that a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the
intention of its makers'")(quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459
(1892)). See SINGER, supra note 65, at § 45.05 for a general discussion of this rule of statutory
interpretation.
69. The reports prepared by the committees of Congress that had jurisdiction over bills en-
acted into law are accepted by the federal judiciary as the most authoritative statements of con-
gressional intent for legislation. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 210 n.16 (2003). See SINGER,
supra note 65, at § 48.05 for a general discussion of this rule of statutory interpretation.
70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(3), 80a-2(a)(9), 80a-10 (2000).
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pected to resist attempts to disadvantage the shareholders of the com-
pany for the benefit of the persons managing the company. Thus, the
report by the Senate committee on the legislation that added the con-
cept of interested person to the Act employed the caption "strengthen-
ing independent checks on investment company management" to
introduce § 2(a)(19) and discuss paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii). 71 In
a similarly worded section, the report by the House committee em-
ployed a neutral caption,72 but like the report of the Senate commit-
tee, it pointed out that (i) an investment company board must have
directors who "supply an independent check on management" and are
responsible "for the representation of shareholder interests in invest-
ment company affairs; '73 (ii) directors who are merely unaffiliated
with the investment company 74 have not satisfactorily performed this
function; and (iii) the concept of interested director had been devel-
oped and was being proposed to "remedy the Act's deficiencies in this
regard. '75 Congress thus unquestionably sought to restrict the range
of conditions under which a person can be an independent (i.e., non-
interested) director, and given this purpose, a plausible inference is
that, with respect to paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii), Congress
wanted the word "business" and the word "professional" to encom-
pass entirely different types of relationships.
In light of the evident intent of Congress, the meaning of the word
"business" and the meaning of the word "professional" must be ascer-
tained. The Investment Company Act, while furnishing definitions for
numerous words,76 does not define either "business" or "profes-
sional," and for these words, Congress must be assumed to have
adopted the meanings that were generally accepted in the United
States at the time the words were placed in the Act.77 The Supreme
71. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS
ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 91-184, at 32 (1st Sess. 1969) (emphasis added).
72. In the report by the House committee, the heading used for the discussion was "Section-
by-Section Analysis," with a subheading "Section 2(a)(3) - Amending Section 2(a) - Adding
Definition of New Term 'Interested Person."' HousE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, INVESTMENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1970, H. R. REP. No. 91-1382, at 13
(2d Sess. 1970)
73. H.R. REP. No. 91-1382, at 13; S. REP. No. 91-184, at 32. See also supra note 44 and accom-
panying text.
74. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
75. H. R. REP. No. 91-1382, at 14, 15; S. REP. No. 91-184, at 32.
76. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
77. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 nn. 20, 21 (1976), where the Court uses
a dictionary published in 1934 to define words in a statute that was enacted in the same year.
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Court has observed that "when a word is not defined by statute we
normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning. ' 78
Of the two words, "business" is the simpler to define. Dictionaries
published contemporaneously with the adoption in 1970 of the inter-
ested-person standard include the following definitions of the word
"business." The definitions reproduced are those that appear appro-
priate in the settings to which paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii) apply.
"1. The occupation, work, or trade in which a person is engaged.
2. Commercial, industrial, or professional dealings; the buying and
selling of commodities or services. . . . 5. Commercial policy or
practice. ... 7. Serious work or endeavor that pertains to one's job:
went to Tokyo on business .... ,,79
"1. an occupation, profession, or trade: His business is poultry
farming. 2. Econ. the purchase and sale of goods in an attempt to
make a profit. 3. Com. a person, partnership, or corporation en-
gaged in commerce, manufacturing, or a service; profit-seeking en-
terprise or concern ..."80
The preceding definitions suggest that the concept of business con-
tains a significant monetary dimension. At the same time, however,
the definitions indicate that business can encompass "professional
dealings" or "profession."8 Nonetheless, not all manifestations of
professional activity need to be, or were necessarily intended by Con-
gress to be, subsumed under the category of business. Unfortunately,
when interpreting paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii) of § 2(a)(19), the
staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission appears to be com-
fortable only with the concept of business. For example, without ex-
amining professional relationships, the staff has concluded in a
number of no-action letters that investment company directors were
potentially involved in material business relationships, and hence
might be interested persons, as the apparent result of financial consid-
erations.82 In other no-action letters,83 the staff did not focus on pro-
78. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223. 228 (1993). A general discussion of this rule of statu-
tory interpretation is found in SINGER, supra note 65, at § 46.01.
79. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 180 (1969).
80. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 201 (1970).
81. The Oxford English Dictionary, too, defines "business" as including inter alia "[a] person's
official or professional duties as a whole; stated occupation, profession, or trade" and "[a] partic-
ular occupation; a trade or profession." 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 695 (2d ed. 1989).
82. Bridges Inv. Fund, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1971 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 916 (June 10,
1971); C. I. Convertible Fund, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2416
(June 2, 1974); Cal-Western Separate Account A, SEC No-Action Letter, [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 80,444, at 86,173, available at 1976 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 574
(March 8, 1976); Crown Western Inv., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
4171 (Nov. 20, 1972); Equitable of Iowa Variable Annuity Account A, SEC No-Action Letter,
[1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 76,744, at 77,061 (Jan. 6, 1980); MONY Fund,
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fessional relationships even though such a focus would have been
appropriate. To date, then, business relationships have dominated the
interpretation of paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii), and professional re-
lationships have not been considered on their own.
Given the wording of paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii) and the
available evidence of congressional intent for the paragraphs, profes-
sional relationships should not be neglected or subsumed within busi-
ness relationships. The reports of both the Senate committee and the
House committee on the legislation that incorporated the interested-
person standard into the Investment Company Act declare at one
point that "substantial financial or professional relationships" will be
covered by paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii). 84 By substituting the
word "financial" for the word "business," the reports reveal a congres-
sional belief that business is characterized by a significant pecuniary
element. At the same time, the disjunctive "or" was inserted between
the two named relationships. Because Congress did not need to men-
tion professional dealings if it viewed them as being business in na-
ture, Congress evidently sought to distinguish professional
relationships from business relationships. Furthermore, in neither the
Act nor its legislative history did Congress indicate that professional
relationships are to be included within business relationships. This in-
tent could have been inferred from a statement that paragraphs
(A)(vii) and (B)(vii) encompass, for example, "business relationships
of all types, including those of a professional nature" or "professional
and other forms of business relationships." Since no such statement
was made by the committees of Congress that were responsible for the
legislation, professional relationships were apparently regarded as
separate from business relationships. However, if professional rela-
tionships and business relationships are discrete phenomena, the for-
mer necessarily possesses different attributes than the latter. Indeed, if
professional relationships do not possess distinct attributes, they can-
not constitute a category of their own. Accordingly, the attributes of
professional relationships are considered next.
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,661, at
81,402 (Jan. 29, 1972); NEA Mutual Fund, SEC No-Action Letter, 1971 SEC No-Act. LEXIS
753 (June 3, 1971). [hereinafter "Business Relationships Letters"].
83. The letters are reviewed in part V. See infra notes 111-135 and accompanying text.
84. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS
ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 91-184, at 32 (1st Sess. 1969) (emphasis added); HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, INVESTMENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1970,
H.R. REP. No. 91-1382, at 13 (2d Sess. 1970) (emphasis added).
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IV. THE NATURE OF PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
Congress is most likely to have employed the adjective "profes-
sional" to refer to activities that constitute a profession. The use of
"professional" in this manner is consistent both with the generally ac-
cepted meaning of the word "professional" 85 and with the purpose of
paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii). That purpose is the avoidance of sit-
uations capable of compromising the ability of a director to be an ad-
vocate for shareholders.86 Both participation in a business and
participation in a profession carry the potential to breed, or be accom-
panied by, a degree of self-interest that disables an individual from
acting for the benefit of others.
Since self-interest may lack a pecuniary motive or possess a merely
incidental pecuniary motive, professional relationships may not be
driven by a personal financial incentive, and such professional rela-
tionships can be distinguished from business relationships, which by
definition involve a strong financial motive. 87 Professional relation-
ships may nonetheless lead their participants to pursue self-serving
goals, because professional relationships may allow their participants
to secure influence for themselves, increase their prestige, and/or sat-
isfy a narcissistic personality need. 88
85. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1045 (1969) ("professional" includes "[o]f, related to,
engaged in, or suitable for a profession"); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE 1148 (1970) ("professional" includes "pertaining or appropriate to a profession").
86. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
87. The New York Stock Exchange requires that independent directors comprise a majority of
the board of each issuer listed on the Exchange and defines independence to be the absence of a
"material relationship" with the issuer. While professional relationships are not explicitly named
in defining independence, the Exchange mentions inter alia "charitable relationships" in illus-
trating relationships that may be material. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL Standard 303A.00, 303A.01, 303A.02 cmt., at http://www.nyse.com/listed/
1022221393251.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005). However, most participants in charitable organi-
zations probably do not have a monetary incentive for becoming involved in the organizations,
and given the attributes of a profession (discussed infra), their participation is professional
rather than business in character.
88. This type of motivation can apparently be involved in a violation of section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).
Specifically, securities trading by an insider will be illegal under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 if
inter alia the insider seeks to benefit personally from the securities transaction. See Dirks v. Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 646, 662-664 (1983). However, "a specific or tangible benefit" is not
necessary. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1998). Thus, the benefit
need not be financial. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1275, 1280-1281 (11th
Cir. 2003). Rather, the benefit, if wanted by the insider, can evidently be social or emotional in
nature.
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But if a profession can generate self-interest, what is a "profes-
sion"? 89 An answer is available in two sources: (i) social science re-
search on occupations that are professions and (ii) documents in the
field of law that emanate from studies concerned with the image and
role of lawyers. Each will be discussed in turn.
A. "Profession" as defined by social science research
Social scientists have devoted considerable effort to identify the
characteristics that define an occupation as a profession, and they
have also attempted to determine the functions and consequences of
professions. 90 The former task, which is the focus of this part of the
article, seems to have been undertaken mainly by sociologists while
the latter task seems to have been mainly the province of
economists. 9'
The attributes of a profession appear not to be universal because
the occupations that are labeled "professions" vary between historical
eras within the same country and vary between countries at the same
point in time.92 However, since the middle of the twentieth century,
according to social scientists, the following have been recognized as
key traits of an occupation in the United States that is a profession:93
* The occupation is based upon a substantial body of knowledge
that involves abstract concepts and complex principles and that is
possessed by a small segment of the population. Since this knowl-
edge is essential to performing the tasks of the occupation, entry
into the occupation necessitates a relatively long period of
education.
0 The occupation has established and enforces standards for the
ethical behavior of its members.
* The occupation regulates the conditions and content of its work.
Consequently, members of the occupation control entry into the oc-
cupation and possess a high level of individual autonomy in their
job duties.
* A strong, enduring level of dedication to the work of the occu-
pation is expected by the members of the occupation.
89. The historical evolution of professions is described by MAGALI SARFATFI LARSON, THE
RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (University of California Press 1977).
90. See RONALD M. PAVALKO, SOCIOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 19-33 (FE
Peacock Publishers 2d ed. 1988).
91. James W. Begun, Economic and Sociological Approaches to Professionalism, 13 WORK &
OCCUPATIONS 113, 114-116 (1986).
92. ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS 35 (The University of Chicago Press 1986).
93. The list is based on PAVALKO, supra note 90, at 20-29, and on Steven Kerr et al., Issues in
the Study of "Professionals" in Organizations: The Case of Scientists and Engineers, 18 ORGANI-
ZATIONAL BEHAV. & PERFORMANCE 329, 332 (1977). The items in the list are not ranked in
terms of their importance.
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* The members of the occupation both identify with the occupa-
tion and share common interests and values.
a The ideal of service to clients and the public is central to the
motivation for entering the occupation and performing its work.
Special note should be taken of the last trait, for it distinguishes a
profession from a business. While a business chiefly seeks financial
profit, a profession is mainly concerned with the ideal of service. 94
B. "Profession" as defined by studies in law
The concept of a profession underlies the appreciable attention
given in recent decades to a range of problems that are believed to
have increased among practicing lawyers. 95 The concept was even the
subject of an opinion by three justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.96
For the present article, however, the concept has received its most
authoritative and comprehensive treatment within the field of law
from two bodies of the American Bar Association that, in the last
twenty years, have considered professionalism. Inasmuch as the con-
cept of professionalism derives from the word "professional ' 97 and
hence from the concept of "profession, ' 98 the conclusions appearing
in the reports of these bodies merit review even though the conclu-
sions cannot be ascribed to the Association itself.99 Not surprisingly,
the approach of both bodies was shaped by the nature and needs of
the practice of law. 100
94. See PAVALKO, supra note 90, at 24. The motivation for service has been described as "the
polar opposite" of the motivation for monetary return that prevails in business. Id. Some busi-
nesses may possess not only a strong motivation for profit but also a strong motivation for ser-
vice. Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Good Works - With a Business Plan, Bus. WK., May 3, 2004, at
32.
95. See Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself- A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney
Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1344-1348 (1997) (discussing
problems of practicing attorneys).
96. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 488-489 (1988) (O'Connor, J., Rehnquist,
C.J., and Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1045 (1969) ("professionalism" includes
"[pirofessional status, methods, character, or standards"); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1148 (1970) ("professionalism" includes "professional character, spirit, or
methods").
98. See supra note 85.
99. Nonetheless, the American Bar Association holds the copyright on, and hence claims
ownership of, the report of each body.
100. The A.B.A. Model Code of Professional Responsibility identifies "the professional judg-
ment of a lawyer" as central to the activities comprising the practice of law, and states that "[t]he
essence of the professional judgment of the lawyer is his educated ability to relate the general
body and philosophy of law to a specific legal problem of a client." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-5 (1981). Notably, this conceptualization of the practice of law is consis-
tent with one or more of the elements of a profession that have been derived from social science
studies and that were identified by the two bodies of the American Bar Association.
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The first body was an A.B.A. Commission on Professionalism
whose report was released in 1986.101 While the Commission found
that no agreement existed on the meaning of "professionalism," a
sociologist who served as a member of the body identified a list of key
traits delineating a profession that the Commission endorsed as "use-
ful."' 102 Specifically, a profession was described as an occupation the
members of which possess certain privileges because (i) the work of
the occupation demands both considerable education of an intellec-
tual nature and sophisticated judgment, (ii) clients cannot judge the
quality of work done by the practitioners of the occupation and are
therefore forced to trust the practitioners, (iii) dedication to the needs
of the client and the welfare of the public is assumed to overshadow
self-interest on the part of the practitioners, and (iv) the occupation
regulates itself to protect clients and the public against incompetence
and self-serving behavior by practitioners. 10 3
The Professionalism Committee of the Section of Legal Education
and Admissions to the Bar is the second body of the American Bar
Association whose report will be considered here. 10 4 The report,
which was issued in 1996, enumerates the attributes of "a professional
lawyer," and although the attributes could have been described more
clearly, they appear to be consistent with the elements identified
above for a profession. Specifically, a professional lawyer was de-
scribed as possessing six "essential characteristics:" (i) the lawyer has
acquired "knowledge," a word apparently alluding to the concepts
and principles of law; (ii) the lawyer has the ability to apply pertinent
concepts and principles of law to concrete problems; (iii) the lawyer,
in handling a matter, prepares thoroughly; (iv) the lawyer exhibits
"practical and prudential wisdom," a phrase that presumably refers to
the exercise of judgment that is effective and appropriate in the situa-
tion confronting the lawyer; (v) the lawyer adheres to the rules of eth-
101. ABA Commission on Professionalism, ". . . In the Spirit of Public Service:" A Blueprint
for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism (1986), reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243, 261 (1987)
[hereinafter Commission on Professionalism]. A commission is created by a resolution of the
House of Delegates of the Association and remains in existence for a limited period of time in
order to study a particular matter. The resolution of the House of Delegates that establishes a
commission specifies the scope, duties, and powers of the commission. Bylaws of the American
Bar Ass'n House of Delegates § 31.6, at http://www.abanet.org/about/home.html (follow "ABA
Organization" hyperlink; then follow "Constitution and Bylaws."
102. Commission on Professionalism, supra note 101, at 262.
103. Id., reprinted in 112 F.R.D. at 261-262.
104. PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE, ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION & ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM 6 (1996) [hereinafter PROFESSIONALISM
COMMITTEE]. The Professionalism Committee is a special, not a standing, committee. See Amer-
ican Bar Ass'n, Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar Bylaws art. VIII, at http://
www.abanet.org/legaled/section/sectioninfo.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
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ics governing lawyers; and (vi) the lawyer is dedicated to the welfare
of society, including the need of society for justice. 10 5
C. Synthesis
Each of the preceding works has identified attributes of a profes-
sion, but since the works differ to some extent in the attributes they
list, this part of the article attempts to catalogue the characteristics on
which there is a degree of accord. The characteristics on which some
agreement exists are the most likely to be applied, and to be the most
appropriate to apply, in determining whether a relationship is profes-
sional and therefore within the scope of § 2(a)(19) of the Investment
Company Act.
The criterion for determining agreement on an attribute will be the
explicit or implicit presence of the attribute in at least two of the pre-
ceding lists. Using this criterion, the following five attributes appear to
be fundamental to the existence of a profession in the United States at
the present time:
1. The occupation possesses a large body of abstract concepts and
complex principles; 10 6
2. The tasks of the occupation, to be performed effectively, require
sophisticated judgment 10 7 and substantial autonomy;108
105. PROFESSIONALISM COMMITFE, supra note 104, at 6-7.
106. This attribute, in turn, is undoubtedly associated with the higher level of cognitive com-
plexity that has been observed for the professions than other occupations. Kim A. Weeden, Why
Do Some Occupations Pay More than Others? Social Closure and Earnings Inequality in the
United States, 108 AM. J. Soc. 55, 92 (2002).
107. The considerable judgment needed in professions may be attributable in part to the rela-
tively high level of uncertainty that characterizes the subject matter of professions. See William
C. Baer, Expertise and Professional Standards, 13 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 532, 539-542 (1986).
108. The Securities and Exchange Commission implicitly recognized the nature of the judg-
ment and degree of autonomy needed for the practice of law when it required that any attorney
for the non-interested directors of specified investment companies be "independent." See Role
of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-
24816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 16, 2001). Specifically, an attorney who personally, or an attorney
whose law firm, has represented certain parties with close ties to the investment company (e.g.,
as investment adviser or principal underwriter) during the last two completed fiscal years of the
company can serve as "independent legal counsel" to the non-interested directors only if a ma-
jority of such directors reasonably believe that the "professional judgment" of the attorney is not
likely to be impaired. 17 C.F.R. § 270.0-1(6) (2004).
Empirical evidence pertinent to the level of autonomy in professions is found in Patrick B.
Forsyth & Thomas J. Danisiewicz, Toward a Theory of Professionalization, 12 WORK & OCCUPA-
TIONS 59 (1985). The level of judgment that characterizes a profession is evidently tied to the
level of autonomy in a profession: Research suggests that occupational autonomy, not occupa-
tional position, accounts for complex intellectual functioning and that occupational autonomy
and complex intellectual functioning are mutually reinforcing. See Melvin L. Kohn & Carrie
Schoenbach, Class, Stratification, and Psychological Functioning, in WORK AND PERSONALITY:
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3. Training for entry into the occupation is lengthy; 109
4. Service to clients and/or the public, not personal financial aggran-
dizement, is the principal ideal motivating individuals to join the
profession and perform its tasks; and
5. The occupation regulates itself and, as part of doing so, estab-
lishes and enforces ethical standards for the behavior of its
members.
Using the above as the defining features of a profession, three fac-
tual situations that were the subject of "no-action" letters from the
staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission will be examined. 110
The letters, which are written by the staff, are the main source of law
on the Investment Company Act. The three cases to be reviewed offer
an opportunity to consider professional relationships apart from busi-
ness relationships.
V. PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN No-ACTION LETTERS
Unfortunately, neither the commissioners nor the staff of the Com-
mission appear to have focused on professional relationships per se
under paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii) of § 2(a)(19). Although busi-
ness relationships have been severed from professional relationships
and been the subject of separate treatment in a number of in-
stances,' the reverse apparently has not occurred: professional rela-
tionships have only been discussed in conjunction with business
relationships.
In three no-action letters, however, the Commission staff has had
the opportunity to examine professional relationships on their own.
Since the failure to take advantage of the opportunity can be instruc-
tive, each of the three letters is discussed below.
A. S & P Counselors Fund, Inc.112
In S&P Counselors Fund, Inc., two directors of a registered invest-
ment company planned to collaborate on the revision of a book, and
AN INQUIRY INTO THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 154, 169-170, 172-174 (Melvin L.
Kohn et al. eds., 1983).
109. The argument has been advanced that the sole source of training for the professions in a
society are the organizations that deliver higher education. Steven Brint, Eliot Freidson's Con-
tribution to the Sociology of Professions, 20 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 259, 263 (1993).
110. Donna M. Nagy, Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretations in SEC No-Action Let-
ters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 921 (1998) (discussing
the nature and importance of no-action letters).
111. See Business Relationships Letters, supra note 82.
112. S&P Counselors Fund, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 78,619, at 81,319 (Jan. 2, 1972), available at 1972 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 153
(Jan. 2, 1972).
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as coauthors of the revised book, they would earn royalties from its
sales. The status of one director ("director #1") was not in question.
Director #1, in addition to being a director of the investment com-
pany, served on the board of directors of the investment adviser to the
investment company, chaired the board of the entity that wholly
owned the adviser and principal underwriter for the investment com-
pany, and held an option to purchase stock of the parent. As a result,
director #1 was indisputably interested in the investment company.1 13
Whether the second director ("director #2") was interested, how-
ever, was not clear. Director #2 had been the senior of two authors of
the first edition of the book.114 In revising the book, director #2 would
not only work with director #1 but would also utilize the library of the
parent of the investment adviser and principal underwriter for a pe-
113. Director #1 was not interested in the investment company by virtue of being a director of
the company. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A) (2000 and Supp. II 2002). Instead, director #1 was
interested in the investment company through § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iii), which provides that any
person interested in an investment adviser to or principal underwriter for an investment com-
pany is interested in the investment company. Section 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iii) applied to director #1
in two ways. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iii). First, as a director of the investment adviser to the
investment company, director #1 was affiliated with the adviser through § 80a-2(a)(3)(D) and
hence interested in the adviser through § 80a-2(A)(19)(B)(i). 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(3), 80a-
2(a)(19) (2000). Under § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iii), he was then interested in the investment com-
pany. Id. Second, a person is interested in an investment adviser to or principal underwriter for
an investment company under § 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(iii) if the person knowingly owns, directly or
indirectly, a security of an issuer that controls such an adviser or principal underwriter. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(iii). An option is a security under § 80(a)-2(a)(36), and a parent is
presumed by § 2(a)(9) to control a subsidiary when it owns in excess of 25% of the voting securi-
ties of the subsidiary. Since director #1 knowingly held a security (i.e., an option) issued by the
entity that wholly owned, and thus presumptively controlled, the investment adviser to and prin-
cipal underwriter for the investment company, he was interested in the adviser and principal
underwriter. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(9), 80a-2(a)(19), 80a-2(a)(36) (2000). Section
2(a)(19)(A)(iii), in turn, caused him to be interested in the investment company.
Director #1 would also be interested in the investment company if the principal underwriter
and its parent are treated as a single entity because the former is a wholly owned subsidiary of
the latter. See Southwestern Investors, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,172, at 80,537 (May 14, 1971), available at 1971 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 1204 (May 14, 1971) (collapsing a parent with an indirectly, wholly owned subsidiary). If
the two entities are combined in the analysis, director #1 would be considered a director of the
principal underwriter because he was a current director of the parent. As a director of the
principal underwriter, director #1 would be deemed by § 80a-2(a)(3)(D) to be affiliated with the
principal underwriter, and his affiliation with the principal underwriter would make him inter-
ested in the principal underwriter through § 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(i). As a person interested in the
principal underwriter, director #1 would be interested in the investment company by virtue of
§ 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iii). 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(3)(D), 80a-2(a)(19) (2000).
114. JEROME B. COHEN & EDWARD D. ZINBARG, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO
MANAGEMENT (R.D. Irwin 1967). The letter sent to the Commission gives the title of the book
and the name of director #2 as an author of the book; other information on the book was ob-
tained from the Library of Congress Online Catalog, at http://catalog.loc.gov (last visited Feb. 7,
2006).
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riod that was expected to last a maximum of nine months. Director #2,
who was a retired university professor, also expected to use the library
of his university, but the latter library evidently lacked resources that
were available in the library of the parent of the adviser and principal
underwriter. The parent controlled its subsidiaries (i.e., the investment
adviser and principal underwriter) by owning all of their voting securi-
ties.115 In addition, director #1 may have controlled the subsidiaries 1 6
by chairing the board of their parent.1 17 A relationship with an entity
or natural person controlling the investment adviser or principal un-
derwriter for an investment company is within the scope of paragraph
(B)(vii).
The staff concluded that the arrangement proposed for the revision
of the book "may" involve director #2 in a "material business or pro-
fessional relationship" under § 2(a)(19)(B)(vii). 118 Unfortunately, the
response of the staff names both directors, as well as the parent of the
adviser and principal underwriter, in stating that the arrangement
might produce a relationship covered by the section. Key questions
therefore cannot be answered: Did the staff believe that the relation-
ship would be business (and material) in nature, because the two di-
rectors would receive royalties from sales of the revision? If so, did
the staff think that the presence of director #1 as a coauthor of the
revised book might be expected by director #2 to increase substan-
tially the sales of the book and, hence, the royalties received by direc-
tor #2? Did the staff conclude that the library of the parent had
significant monetary value and that access to it was thus a distinct fi-
nancial benefit to director #2? The resources of this library were ap-
parently unavailable at the library of the university at which director
#2 was a professor emeritus and were presumably exceptional. The
parent of the adviser and principal underwriter had undoubtedly ex-
pended appreciable sums for the books and journals in its library and
for its operation.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9) (2000).
116. Section 80a-2(a)(9), in referring to "a controlling influence," allows for the possibility
that control of a company may be exercised by more than one party. Indeed, the section creates
a rebuttable presumption that a company is controlled by any owner of more than 25% of the
voting securities of the company; through voting securities, therefore, three parties can control a
company. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9) (2000).
117. Section 80a-2(a)(9) of the Investment Company Act defines "control" as "the power to
exercise a controlling influence over the management or policies of a company, unless such
power is solely the result of an official position with such company." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9)
(2000). Because of the exclusion for "an official position," director #1 cannot be deemed to
control the parent, but the exclusion does not preclude a finding that, as chair of the board of the
parent, director #1 controlled the subsidiaries, which are different companies.
118. S&P Counselors Fund, supra note 112, at 81,320.
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Apart from the above possibilities, however, the staff could have
found that, in revising and co-authoring the book, the two directors
might be engaged in a relationship that was professional (and mate-
rial) in character. A plausible argument can be made that the ele-
ments of such a relationship were present: the subject of the book
(viz., the analysis and management of investments) involved theoreti-
cal concepts and sophisticated principles. Indeed, the preface to the
revised edition states that the revision was mainly concerned with in-
corporating and describing the application of "the major advances
which have been made in portfolio theory and risk management," and
that the revision was effected in part by the addition of a third author,
namely director #1, to the two authors of the first edition. 119
Moreover, the revision of the book required that the authors exer-
cise judgment and be free from inflexible rules in selecting, explaining,
and critiquing relevant concepts and principles. At the same time,
preparation of the book was governed by the standards that have been
established by scholars themselves (e.g., as to the acceptance of con-
cepts and principles in the discipline). Finally, since the book was pro-
duced and marketed by a prominent publishing house, the revision
could be expected to be read by numerous investors and hence have a
public benefit.
On the other hand, director #2 was unlikely to have been motivated
primarily by monetary gain to revise the book with director #1 as a co-
author. Director #2 probably could not anticipate increased royalties
from the revision and, indeed, could well anticipate reduced royalties
because the addition of director #1 as a co-author would presumably
require the division of royalties with one more author. Instead, direc-
tor #2 was more likely to have wanted to co-author the revision with
director #1 because he expected personal satisfaction from improving
the book and from being the lead author of a recognized text.
The case thus presented an opportunity for the Commission staff to
apply the concept of a professional relationship. Regrettably, advan-
tage was not taken of the opportunity. Instead, the staff chose neither
to discuss whether it believed the arrangement would give rise to a
professional relationship nor to explain how the decision was reached.
119. JEROME B. COHEN, EDWARD D. ZINBARG, & ARTHUR ZEIKEL, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS
AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT viii (R.D. Irwin rev. ed. 1973). The first edition of the book had
been published in 1967. COHEN & ZINBARG, supra note 114. The senior author of the revision is
director #2; the second-listed author of the revision was the junior author of the first edition; and
director #1 is named last as an author of the revision. A third edition of the book was published
in 1977, a fourth edition in 1982, and a fifth edition in 1987. Authorship of the third, fourth, and
fifth editions was by the same three authors, with no change in the order in which they were
listed. Library of Congress Online Catalog, supra note 114.
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B. CG Fund, Inc.120
The facts presented by CG Fund, Inc. are relatively simple. The
president of a private university was a member of the board of three
registered investment companies ("funds") and designated as an inde-
pendent director of these funds. Whether he could continue as an in-
dependent director came into question when the individual who
chaired the board of the investment adviser to the funds, and who
served as president of the funds, was proposed for election to the re-
gents (i.e., the governing board) of the university. The regents, whose
number was limited to 46, included alumni, residents of the geo-
graphic area where the university was located, and current faculty
members and students. The president of the university, by virtue of his
position as chief executive officer of the university, was also a regent.
No regent received financial compensation for serving as a regent.
Would the presence on the board of regents of the officer of the
three funds and chair of the board of their adviser alter the status of
the president of the university as a director of the funds? The staff
concluded that it would not recommend action by the Commission
under paragraph (B)(vii) 121 to ascertain whether a material business
or professional relationship would exist between the president of the
university, on the one hand, and the principal executive officer (the
chair of the board) of the funds' adviser, on the other, if the latter
were elected a university regent. 122 As a prerequisite, however, the
staff expressly required the lawyer who represented the investment
companies to conclude that the president of the university would con-
tinue to qualify as an independent director of the funds.1 23
Given the substantial compensation that some college and univer-
sity presidents have garnered in recent years,124 a question exists
120. CG Fund, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 78,712, at 81,496 (Feb. 10, 1972), available at 1972 SEC NoAct. LEXIS 690 (Feb. 10,
1972).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(vii).
122. Although the individual chairing the board of the investment adviser was also the presi-
dent of the funds, the staff reply makes no reference to his role as president. If the president of
the funds was their principal executive officer and had a material business or professional rela-
tionship with the president of the university, the latter would be an interested director of the
funds through paragraph (A)(vii). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(vii).
123. The letter of inquiry sent to the staff focused only on whether a "material business rela-
tionship" might be present. In its response, the staff refers to a "material business or profes-
sional relationship. CG Fund, Inc., supra note 120, at 81,497. In so doing, the response raised
the matter of a professional relationship but failed to clarify the difference(s) between a profes-
sional relationship and a business relationship. Id.
124. Julie L. Nicklin, 74 Private-College Presidents Earned More Than $300,000 in 1998-99,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 24, 2000, at A26 (individuals recruited for university presidencies
"are negotiating harder for higher compensation these days, even bringing in lawyers to do the
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whether the response of the staff in this case should be applied to all
college and university presidents at the present time. A regent of a
college or university votes on the appointment (including the renewal
of the appointment) of its president and on the amount of compensa-
tion to be received by the president. As a result, a material business
relationship could well currently exist between the president of a col-
lege or university and a regent.
The pertinent question here, however, is whether in the 1970s there
would have been a material professional relationship between the uni-
versity president who was an investment company director and a re-
gent who was the president of the investment company and chair of its
adviser. The question can be answered in the affirmative because, as a
manager of and/or policy maker for a university, both individuals were
required to: (i) appreciate, even if they did not possess a comprehen-
sive and detailed grasp of, the body of advanced knowledge with
which the university dealt;125 (ii) exercise the sophisticated judgment
necessary to preserve and promote the standing of the university;126
(iii) possess the intellectual skills that allow the nature and needs of a
university to be analyzed and understood; and (iv) develop and imple-
ment the formal and informal standards set by the regents. 127 Moreo-
ver, if the university president in this case would not have been
involved in a business (i.e., financial) relationship with the officer of
the funds and the chair of the board of their adviser once the latter
was a regent - a conclusion the staff was willing to accept - service to
the public and to students, rather than pecuniary gain, was presuma-
bly the main motivation for both individuals in their respective roles
at the university. 12
The situation facing the CG Fund, then, involved the possibility that
a professional relationship would be present and that it would be ma-
bargaining for them"); Julianne Basinger, Proving Presidential Worth, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Nov. 19, 2004, at 11 (in the 2003 fiscal year, the number of presidents of private colleges who
were paid in excess of $500,000 reached 42, an increase of 56% from the prior year; Derek Bok,
Are Huge Presidential Salaries Bad for Colleges?, CHRON. HIGHER EDuc., Nov. 22, 2002, at 20
(noting that high compensation for university presidents is recent).
125. See Bok, supra note 124.
126. Lloyd H. Elliott, How Much Does a College President Deserve to be Paid?, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., March 10, 2000, at A64. See Bok, supra note 123.
127. See NAT'L Ass'N OF INDEPENDENT COLLEGES & UNIVERSITIES, THE RESPONSIBILITIES
OF INDEPENDENCE: APPROPRIATE ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH SELF-REGULATION (FINAL RE-
PORT OF THE NAICU TASK FORCE ON APPROPRIATE ACCOUNTABILITY) (1994), at http://
www.naicu.edu/pubs/PubsOrder.shtm (last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
128. See Bok, supra note 124. "After all, few presidents enter college administration and ac-
cept leadership positions to make money. For them, the real appeal of the job is the chance to
make a difference, to exercise influence in a worthy cause, to deal with interesting issues and
tackle challenging problems." Id. See Elliott, supra note 125.
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terial, but the staff sidestepped the task of deciding whether a profes-
sional relationship would exist. Neglecting the concept of a
professional relationship, however, is inconsistent with congressional
intent for paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii) of § 2(a)(19).
C. Securities Groups1 2 9
The last of the no-action letters that will be examined involved a
registered investment company ("fund") being established by a sub-
sidiary of an investment bank. The subsidiary would be the investment
adviser to the fund, and a proposed independent director of the fund
would be an economist who was a member of an "International Mon-
etary Advisory Board" of the bank. The sole responsibility of a mem-
ber of the advisory board of the bank was to make presentations at
symposia organized semiannually by the bank for individuals working
in the financial sector, in corporations, in government, or in religious
entities. For the one symposium held since the fund was incorporated,
the bank had paid the economist $2000 for his presentation in addition
to reimbursing his travel expenses. If the economist were to become a
director of the fund, however, he would receive no compensation for
his presentations at subsequent symposia.
Both paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii) of § 2(a)(19) apply to mate-
rial business and professional relationships, but the economist was po-
tentially covered just by paragraph (B)(vii): the economist had a
relationship with a person (specifically, the bank) that presumptively
controlled the investment adviser to the fund.130 If a material business
or professional relationship had been present between the economist
and the bank, paragraph (B)(vii) would have caused the economist to
be an interested person of the adviser, and paragraph (A)(iii) would
have caused him to be an interested person of the fund.131 However,
the staff did not discuss whether a business and/or professional rela-
tionship between the economist and the bank had existed in the past
129. Securities Groups, SEC No-Action Letter 1981 SEC NoAct. LEXIS 3490 (April 20,
1981).
130. Securities Groups, supra note 129, at *3. The investment adviser was a corporation and a
subsidiary of the bank. Accordingly, more than one-half of the voting stock issued by the ad-
viser was owned by the bank. Id. See JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, BARRON'S
FINANCE & INVESTMENT HANDBOOK 853 (Barron's 6th ed. 1995) (definition of "subsidiary").
The Investment Company Act establishes a rebuttable presumption that a corporation is con-
trolled by a beneficial owner of more than 25% of its voting securities. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(8)-
(9) (2000).
131. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iii), 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(vii) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). Para-
graph (B)(vii) includes a material business or professional relationship with inter alia a person
controlling the investment adviser to the investment company. 15 U.S.C. § 80s-
21(19)(B)(vii)(2000 & Supp. II 2002.
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or would exist in the future; it merely concluded that a material rela-
tionship was absent. In terms of the symposium presentation for which
the economist had been paid $2000 by the bank, the staff believed that
the amount was "not so significant as to tend to impair his indepen-
dence. ' 132 Given this conclusion, it should not be surprising that the
staff also decided that future presentations, for which the bank would
provide no compensation, would not create a material relationship.
The position of the staff, however, bypasses the initial question that
ought to be posed regarding the symposia presentations, namely,
whether there is a business relationship or a professional relationship.
As explained in part III of this article, 133 the materiality of a relation-
ship ought to arise as an issue only after one of the two types of rela-
tionship is found to exist. The question that is important here, of
course, is whether a professional relationship (rather than a business
relationship) was present. That the staff furnished no answer to the
question evidences an unwillingness to deal with the nature of profes-
sional relationships under § 2(a)(19). The avoidance of the question is
especially notable because the inquiry sent to the staff by the bank
explicitly referred to the possibility of a professional relationship be-
tween the economist and the bank without mentioning the possibility
of a business relationship. 134
The staff reaction to the Securities Groups thus manifests what ap-
pears to be a general resistance on the part of the Commission to ac-
cepting professional relationships in their own right. That the question
of a professional relationship in the case was sidestepped is significant
because economics clearly possesses the attributes of a profession.
Specifically, the concepts of economics are abstract, and its principles
are complex. Moreover, the economist here had undergone extensive
training in that he had earned a Ph.D. degree and held a position com-
132. Securities Groups, supra note 129, at *3.
133. See supra text accompanying note 64.
134. The investment bank pointed out that the economist, after becoming a director, would
receive no financial compensation for participating in symposia sponsored by the bank, and con-
tended that this would "preclude any question of a professional relationship existing in the fu-
ture" with the bank. Securities Groups, supra note 129, at *5. The letter to the staff thus
explicitly associated professional relationships with monetary compensation in terms of future
symposia. However, the bank acknowledged in the same paragraph that the relationship in the
past between the economist and the bank "might" be characterized as "a professional one" be-
cause the economist was a member of the advisory board of the bank. Id. The bank argued that
a professional relationship, if it existed, could not be deemed material in degree, but whether
prior monetary remuneration for symposia presentations was the basis for this contention is
unclear. Id. Since the bank raised the possibility of a professional relationship, the staff could
have discussed the nature of such a relationship and linked it to the attributes of a profession
described in part IV of this article. The staff did not do so presumably because it assumed that a
professional relationship is a type of business relationship.
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mensurate with a doctorate. 135 Accordingly, he would have been exer-
cising sophisticated judgment in dealing with the phenomena
comprising his occupation, would have had considerable latitude in his
work, and would have been subject to the precepts of science as to
inter alia standards for the analysis of quantitative data. The econo-
mist was also significantly involved in important matters of public pol-
icy1 3 6 and, hence, in public service.
VI. CONCLUSION
As is apparent from parts IV and V of this article, paragraphs
(A)(vii) and (B)(vii) of § 2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act
place us at the intersection of law and social science. Research in the
sociology of occupations suggests that the defining elements of a pro-
fession are more numerous and less certain than the defining elements
of a business, indicating that professional relationships are more diffi-
cult to identify than business relationships. Over time, moreover, the
United States has evidently developed new types and a larger number
of professions, 137 as well as become generally more heterogeneous. 138
Societal heterogeneity may present an obstacle to determining the ex-
istence of a professional relationship because whether a relationship is
professional may vary from one subpopulation to another.
Given the inherently uncertain and multifaceted nature of profes-
sions, the task of the Securities and Exchange Commission under
paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii) is more complicated when dealing
with professional relationships than when dealing with business rela-
tionships. In addition, the hurdle posed by the need to understand a
non-law discipline (viz., sociology) may contribute to the reluctance of
the Commission to recognize professional relationships and distin-
135. The economist, Arthur B. Laffer, received a Ph.D. in economics from a Stanford Univer-
sity and headed a firm he had founded that provided economic research and consulting to asset
managers at financial institutions. Greater Talent Network, Inc.,at http://www.greatertalent.com/
biography.php?id=504 (last visited Feb. 6, 2006); Keynote Speakers, Inc., at http://
www.keynotespeakers.com/speaker-detail.asp?id=702 (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
136. Id.
137. See LARSON, supra note 89, at 178. Cf. Gregory Williams, The Changing U.S. Labor
Force and Occupational Differentiation by Sex, 16 DEMOGRAPHY 73, 79 (1979) (the number of
occupations in the United States increased from 252 in 1900 to 670 in 1970).
138. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 8, at table 42 (proportion of U.S. population that was
born in another country was 6.2% in 1980, 7.9% in 1990, and 11.1% in 2000); Frank M. Gollop &
James L. Monahan, A Generalized Index of Diversification: Trends in U.S. Manufacturing, 73
REV. ECON. & STAT. 318 (1991); Anthony Bianco, The Vanishing Mass Market, Bus. WK., JULY
12, 2004, AT 61.
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guish them from business relationships. 139 Difficulty, however, cannot
excuse the persistent unwillingness of an administrative agency to reg-
ulate an activity that Congress has decided should be regulated, espe-
cially when the congressional decision is explicitly stated in
legislation. 140 All, not just some, facets of a statute must be enforced.
If for no other reason than that independent directors are increasingly
regarded in the United States as essential to the fortunes of corpora-
tions and their shareholders, 141 the independence of directors should
be determined by each and every factor specified in legislation. The
Commission is obligated to do no less under the Investment Company
Act if it is to fulfill the mandate expressly imposed on it by Congress
to protect investors and promote the public welfare. 42
The statutory mandate of the Commission has implications that ex-
tend beyond those that are economic in nature, and it is unfortunate
that the non-economic implications of this mandate are infrequently
acknowledged. Since an economy functions within a society, the Com-
mission has effects on the broader social system. The Commission, as
the administrative agency responsible for implementing federal securi-
ties statutes, 43 is charged with maintaining (and, when needed, restor-
ing) the trust of the public in securities and securities markets, a task
that is critical for our society given the evident impact of the level of
trust on the robustness of the financial sector of a country. 44 In addi-
tion, the rules and enforcement actions of the Commission symbolize
fundamental values embedded in the social order (e.g., as to equality
of treatment) and affect the reputation of the organizations that com-
prise and participate in securities markets. 45 If these social outputs -
139. Douglas W. Vick, Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law, 31 J.L. & Soc'Y 163
(2004).
140. See Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 511 F.2d 338, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Exxon
Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 265 F.3d 1249, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
141. Grover C. Brown et al., Director and Advisor Disinterestedness and Independence under
Delaware Law, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1157, 1157-1158 (1998) (noting a trend toward an increasing
number of "disinterested and independent directors" on boards of corporations and attributing
the change partially to judicial deference to "decision makers who are capable of making an
impartial business decision").
142. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l(b), 80a-37 (2000). See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
"The Commisison may make such investigations as it deems necessary to determine whether any
person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this subchapter or of any rule, regula-
tion or order hereunder .... Id.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2000); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(a)(1), 78u-3(a) (2000 & Supp. II 2002); 15
U.S.C. § 80a-41 (2000 & Supp. II 2002); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). See Stead
v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 444 F.2d 713, 717 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1059 (1972).
The Commission was created by the Securities Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2000).
144. Calder6n et al., supra note 15; Zak & Knack, supra note 15.
145. Barnett, supra note 23.
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trust, perceptions of fairness, and reputation - promote the opera-
tion of the social system, society benefits, but positive outputs will be
unnecessarily limited if ceteris paribus the Commission continues to
ignore the congressional directive in paragraphs (A)(vii) and (B)(vii)
to focus on the professional relationships of investment company
directors.
